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THE OREGON MEDICAID 
PROGRAM: IS IT JUST? 
Maxwell J. Mehlman, J.D. t 
I. THE OREGON PLAN 
JN 1989, THE OREGON legislature enacted Senate Bill 27, I 
which changed the state's Medicaid program by expanding the 
group of persons eligible to receive benefits under the program.2 At 
the time the measure was passed, only approximately 160,000 of the 
300,000 Oregonians living below the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) 
-that is, earning less than $9,890 per year for a family ofthree3 -
were eligible to receive care under the state's Medicaid program.4 
The intent of the legislature was to expand the program to provide 
health care at least to all Oregonians whose incomes were below the 
FPL. 5 
How is the expansion of the program to be financed? There are 
a limited number of alternatives. One is to increase program fund-
ing, presumably by increasing state taxes. 6 However, Oregon has 
t Professor of Law and Director, The Law-Medicine Center, Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law. B.A., Reed College (1970); B.A., Oxford University (1972); J.D., 
Yale Law School (1975). The author wishes to-thank Susan Gornik and Randy Wilcox for 
their research assistance, Diane Lund, Louise McKinney, Lynn Reed and Terry Rogers for 
their help in sorting out the Oregon Medicaid program, June Sliker for her help with the 
manuscript and my colleagues on the faculty for their helpful suggestions. 
I. Codified within OR. REV. STAT. §§ 414.025 - 414.750 (1989). 
2. The legislature also enacted two related pieces of legislation, Senate Bill 935 (codi-
fied within OR. REV. STAT.§§ 316.096, 317.113, 353.725, 353.765, 353.775 (1989), which, 
beginning in 1994, requires employers to make contributions to a state insurance pool to fund 
basic health care for employees, and Senate Bill 534 (codified within OR. REv. STAT. 
§§ 735.605 - 735.650 (1989), which establishes an insurance pool, to be funded by insurance 
companies, to help cover the costs of care for the uninsured. The provisions of Senate Bill 27 
are more controversial and will be the focus of this paper. 
3. Personal communication from Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington, 
D.C. (April 16, 1990). 
4. HUMAN REsOURCES COMMITTEE OREGON HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1989 
SESSION, STAFF MEASURE SUMMARY at I (June 16, 1989). 
5. Jd. 
6. Additional funds might be sought from the federal government, but since the federal 
government only funds a portion of the costs of the program, the state would have to come up 
with additional funds of its own. 
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been hit with a taxpayer revolt,7 so this alternative is not politically 
attractive. A second alternative is to reduce payments to providers 
of care to Medicaid patients. But providers in Oregon already were 
complaining that their levels of reimbursement were too low, and 
Medicaid recipients would be unable to obtain access to care if 
providers were driven away by inadequate compensation. 8 This 
seems to leave only one alternative: lowering Medicaid expendi-
tures by limiting the medical services that Medicaid would pay for. 9 
Senate Bill 27 adopts this rationing approach. The bill requires 
the state to contract with prepaid, managed care organizations -
i.e. health maintenance organizations - to deliver care to Medicaid 
recipients. 10 To determine how much these organizations would re-
ceive for each Medicaid eligible they enroll, the legislature identh4.es 
the services they must provide, and estimates how much these serv-
ices should cost per enrollee. This enables the legislature to vary 
the total cost of the state's Medicaid program by expanding or con-
tracting the services that are covered. Senate Bill 27 authorizes a 
Health Services Commissionu to determine which services to cover 
by ranking health services in order of priority "from the most im-
portant to the least important."12 In addition, an independent actu-
ary determines how much the state must pay to cover the providers' 
costs, and estimates the number of persons who will be enrolled in 
7. See Welch and Larson, Sounding Board: Dealing with Limited Resources; The Ore-
gon Decision to Curtail Funding for Organ Transplantation, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 171 
(1988). 
8. The President of the Oregon State Senate, John Kitzhaber, stated, for example: 
Money can also be saved for the state by cutting provider reimbursement rates. In 
Oregon, the average provider reimbursement reflects a 55% discount. And while 
this may help balance the budget in the short run, there are two other consequences. 
First, a growing number of providers are refusing to see Medicaid recipients, further 
aggravating the problems of access. Second, those who do continue to treat the 
poor, often shift the uncompensated cost to employers, driving up their premiums. 
See Kitzhaber, The Oregon Basic Health Services Act 5 (1989) (unpublished report). 
9. Another approach would be to reduce the demand for Medicaid services by improv-
ing the health status of Medicaid recipients, such as by providing more preventive care. Since 
the benefit of preventive care is not immediately realized, however, this would not solve the 
budget problem in the short run. 
10. See Senate Bill 27, sec. 6 (enacted as OR. REv. STAT. § 414.725). The state is au-
thorized to pay providers on a fee-for-service basis in those areas in which prepaid, managed 
care is not available. See Sec. 6(1) (enacted as OR. REv. STAT. § 414.725(1)). 
II. The Health Services Commission consists of II members appointed by the governor 
and confirmed by the state senate, comprising 5 physicians, 4 consumers, a public health 
nurse and a social services worker. Senate Bill 27, sec. 4(1) (enacted as OR. REV. STAT. 
414.715(1)). 
12. Senate Bill27, sec. 4a(3)(enacted as OR. REv. STAT.§ 414.720(3)). The statute also 
states that the ranking should represent "the comparative benefits of each service to the entire 
population to be served." Id. 
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1991] THE OREGON MEDICAID PROGRAM 177 
the program. 13 The legislature then decides which services the pro-
gram will cover during the next budget cycle14 by comparing the 
commission's priority ranking with how much the legislature wishes 
to spend. 15 The law also stipulates that, if funding for the Medicaid 
program is insufficient during the budget period - either because 
the legislature underestimates the number of eligibles who are en-
rolled in the program or because revenues needed to fund the pro-
gram are lower than expected - the legislature may not decrease 
the amounts it contracted to pay providers, and may not decrease 
the size of the eligible population; instead, it must further reduce 
the services covered by Medicaid, in the order that they are 
ranked. 16 
The effect of these provisions is to reduce services to the current 
Medicaid recipients in order to expand the Medicaid population. 
Since Oregon anticipates that the actual increase in Medicaid en-
rollees will occur in increments, 17 this will create a succession of 
contractions of services over time. Each expanded group of 
eligibles will be entitled to fewer services than the previous group. 
The sooner a person enrolls, and· the sooner the person is sick, the 
greater the number of services they can receive. 
While the objective of expanding the Oregon Medicaid program 
is commendable, the means adopted by the Oregon legislature to 
control the costs of the expansion are problematic. This paper ex-
amines the legislature's approach from a legal perspective. The first 
part of the paper determines whether it is consistent with federal 
and state law governing the Medicaid program. Oregon is seeking 
waivers from any conflicting federal requirements, 18 and since there 
13. Id. 
14. Oregon is on a two-year budget cycle. See Welch and Larson, supra note 7, at 171. 
15. See Senate Bill 27, sec. 4a(5) (enacted as OR. REv. STAT. § 414.720(5)) ("After 
considering the recommendations of the Joint Legislative Committee on Health Care [which 
consults with the Health Services Commission on the commission's findings], the Legislative 
Assembly shall fund the report to the extent the funds are available to do so."). 
16. Senate Bill 27, sec. 8 (enacted as OR. REv. STAT. § 414.735). 
17. See, e.g., Shostak, Briefing: The Oregon Response to the Medically Uninsured 3 
(July 1989) (unpublished manuscript, Bioethics Consultations Group, Inc.) ("Not all [newly 
eligible Oregonians] will find their way into the program during the.current two year budget 
cycle. The state believes that by the end of the two year fiscal cycle (June 1991) only 10,000 
of these poor but not currently Medicaid eligible persons will be enrolled."). 
18. See Lund, Oregon Plan to Rank Services Rapped as Cutting Benefits, Am. Med. 
News, Feb. 16, 1990, at 3, col. I. The state is seeking a waiver from Congress as well as from 
the Department of Health and Human Services. !d. An important reason for obtaining the 
waivers is so that the federal government will pay a proportion of the costs of providing 
medical care to Oregonians who would not normally be eligible for federal cost sharing -
basically those who do not qualify for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or 
178 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 1:175 
do not appear to be any constitutional impediments, the key ques-
tion is whether the waivers should be granted as a matter of sound 
public policy. The second and third parts of the paper explore this 
question in terms of the two main features of the Oregon plan: pri-
ority ranking of medical services, and redistributing Medicaid re-
sources from current to future eligibles. The final portion of the 
paper considers whether alternative methods of expanding Medi-
caid eligibility would be preferable. 
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE OREGON PLAN 
The Oregon Medicaid program is governed both by federal and 
state law. At the federal level, the program is subject to the require-
ments of the U.S. Constitution, and to the provisions in the federal 
statutes and regulations concerning Medicaid. At the state level, 
the program is governed by the Oregon state constitution and by 
state laws and regulations. 
Assuming that the plan is adopted and administered using the 
correct procedures, it is unlikely to run afoul of the federal or state 
constitutions. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the Con-
stitution does not require the government to provide health care to 
its citizens if they are unable to pay for it themselves. In Maher v. 
Roe, for example, the Court stated that "[t]he Constitution imposes 
no obligation on the States to pay ... any of the medical expenses of 
indigents." 19 In other words, there is no constitutional "right" to 
health care that would prevent the Oregon or federal governments 
from refusing to pay for certain services for the poor, or from refus-
ing to pay for any serVices whatsoever.2° Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court has held that the government may deny benefits to 
those too poor to pay for them without denying equal protection of 
the law.21 
for Supplemental Security Income - and whose care would otherwise be paid for entirely 
with state funds. See HEALTH CARE ACCESS, THE OREGON HEALTH STANDARD, at 9 
(1990) (prepared at the direction of The Oregon State Legislature's Joint Legislative Commit-
tee on Healthcare) ("Federal Medicaid requirements may stand in the way of the Oregon 
plan. Congress needs to waive eligibility barriers for single adults and childless couples living 
in poverty."). 
19. 432 u.s. 464, 469 (1977). 
20. The Oregon constitution does not contain any provisions that warrant a different 
conclusion. 
Ironically, the only exception to the notion that there is no right to health care is in the 
case of prisoners; the Supreme Court has held that denying medical care to prisoners is cruel 
and unusual punishment that violates the fifth amendment. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 
U.S. 307 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
21. The Supreme Court has held that wealth is not a "suspect classification" and there-
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In the absence of constitutional obstacles, the legality of the Or-
egon plan will depend on whether it is consistent with the statutory 
provisions governing the Medicaid program, and if not, on whether 
Congress or the Department of Health and Human Services ex-
empts the plan from the statutory requirements by granting waiv-
ers. Waivers clearly will be needed to permit the state to expand 
Medicaid benefits funded in part by the federal government to per-
sons who do not meet the eligibility requirements of federallaw. 22 
A more controversial issue is raised by the need for waivers for that 
aspect of the plan that denies medically necessary care to those per-
sons who must be covered under Medicaid - the so-called "cate-
gorically needy" - so that more people can be eligible. 
A number of cases have challenged the refusal of a state Medi-
caid plan to cover services that were arguably medically necessary 
for Medicaid recipients. 23 These cases take as their starting point 
fore differential treatment based on wealth does not trigger "strict scrutiny" by the courts. 
See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 41 I U.S. I (1973); James v. Valtierra, 402 
U.S. 137 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). The only exception would be if 
the government denied someone a "fundamental right," a status that the Court has refused to 
extend to health care. See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 18-19. For example, 
the Supreme Court has held that a state can provide lower benefits to ADFC recipients than 
the elderly, blind or permanently disabled without violating equal protection. Jefferson v. 
Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972). The Court, applying limited or "rational basis" scrutiny, 
stated that, "since budgetary constraints do not allow the payment of the full standard of 
need for all welfare recipients, the State may have concluded that the aged and infirm are the 
least able ... to bear the hardships of an inadequate standard of living." I d. at 549. Follow-
ing this precedent, the Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit recently upheld a Pennsylvania 
statute which paid welfare benefits to 18-45 year olds only three months a year instead of 
twelve unless they fit into other "chronically needy" categories, while providing full annual 
benefits to the remaining age groups. Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 89 (3rd Cir. 1983). The 
court stated that the legislature rationally could have concluded that the age classification 
was a relevant distinction that was necessary to meet the legitimate state interests of reallocat-
ing scarce welfare resources and decreasing welfare fraud. Id. at 95-96. Similarly, age classi-
fications are not suspect and are subject only to minimal scrutiny. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 
U.S. 93 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). Oregon's 
scheme might be a denial of equal protection if it denied care to other suspect classes such as 
racial or ethnic groups. However, the Supreme Court has declared that there must be an 
intent to discriminate; the mere fact that one racial .group is disadvantaged compared to 
another is not a violation of equal protection. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. 
Div. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
22. See supra discussion at note 17. 
23. Federal law specifies that states must cover certain services in order to be entitled to 
federal cost-sharing for their Medicaid programs, including, for example, "inpatient hospital 
services." 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(l) (1990) (Federal Medicaid regulations define "inpatient 
hospital services" as "services ... that are ordinarily furnished in a hospital for the care and 
treatment of inpatients." 42 C.F.R. § 442.10(a)). Other services, such as chiropractic, dental 
services and now certain organ transplants, are optional: the state may choose whether or not 
to pay for them. See HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, STATE MEDICAID 
MANUAL 4-203 (1988) (state "can choose to cover no organ transplant procedures, some 
180 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 1:175 
Justice Powell's statement in Beal v. Doe that "serious statutory 
questions might be presented if a state Medicaid plan excluded nec-
essary medical treatment from its coverage."24 Courts have invali-
dated noncoverage of liver transplants25 and transsexual 
operations. 26 In view of these cases, Oregon will need to obtain a 
waiver from the federal government to allow it to deny necessary 
services to categorically needy individuals. 27 
One approach for Oregon to take is to obtain the necessary 
waiver from the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Section 
1115 of the Social Security Act permits the Secretary to waive com-
pliance with, among other things, the requirement that state Medi-
caid plans provide mandated benefits (interpreted by the courts, as 
seen earlier, to include medically necessary inpatient and other serv-
ices), in the case of any experimental, pilot or demonstration pro-
ject which, in the Secretary's judgment, is likely to assist in 
promoting the objectives of the Medicaid program. 28 It could be 
argued that, by authorizing the legislature to deny medically neces-
sary care to Medicaid eligibles, the Oregon plan would not further 
the objectives of Medicaid. The purpose of Medicaid, it might be 
asserted, is not to provide minimal coverage to the largest number 
types of transplants and not others, or all transplants"). In addition, Medicaid is not required 
to pay for treatments that are deemed experimental. See, e.g., Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 
1150, 1156 (5th Cir. 1980). 
24. 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977). 
25. See Montoya v. Johnston, 654 F. Supp. 511 (W.O. Tex. 1987) (child); Allen v. Man-
sour, 681 F. Supp. 1232 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (adult); Lee v. Page, No. 86-1081, CIV-J-14 
(M.D. Fla .. 1986) (same). This was before the Health Care Financing Administration desig-
nated coverage of liver transplants as optional in 1988. See supra note 23. 
26. Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1980); Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546 
(8th Cir. 1980). 
27. Although Oregon's refusal in 1987 to cover certain transplants under Medicaid 
sparked the controversy that led to the enactment of Senate Bill 27, federal law is now clear 
that coverage of transplants is not mandatory under Medicaid. See HEALTH CARE FINANC-
ING ADMINISTRATION, STATE MEDICAID MANUAL 4-203 (1988); Ellis by Ellis v. Patterson, 
859 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1988). Therefore, Oregon will not need a waiver to deny these 
services. The holding in the Ellis case is premised on the legislative history of 1987 amend-
ments to Medicaid. Although the decision therefore is limited to organ transplants and other 
services that Congress has limited expressly, the court's language is instructive in light of the 
Oregon rationing plan: 
[W]e think plaintiff's position that all organ transplants (including hearts and 
lungs) must be covered by Medicaid is unrealistic. Surely Congress did not intend 
to require the states to provide funds for exotic surgeries which, while they may be 
the individual patient's only hope for survival, would also have a small chance of 
success and carry an enormous price tag. Medicaid was not designed to fund risky, 
unproven procedures, but to provide the largest number of necessary medical serv-
ices to the greatest number of needy people. 
859 F.2d at 55. 
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a). 
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of persons, but, through the inducement of federal cost-sharing, to 
insure that the categorically needy obtain necessary services. Con-
gress has demonstrated this intent by restricting the persons whose 
care the federal government would help pay for under Medicaid to 
the "categorically" and "medically" needy, knowing full well that 
many other persons are unable to pay for necessary health services. 
However, the courts have given the Secretary wide discretion to 
grant waivers under section 1115: "The only limitation upon the 
Secretary's authority under section 1115," stated the federal district 
court in Crane v. Mathews, "is that he must judge the project to be 
one which is likely to assist in promoting the objectives of the appli-
cable title of the Act .... Congress has entrusted this judgment to 
the Secretary and not to the courts .... " 29 Given this degree of 
judicial deference to the Secretary, it is unlikely that a court would 
strike down a waiver on the basis that a judgment by the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services that the denial of services was neces-
sary to permit the size of the eligible population to be expanded was 
arbitrary, capricious or without a rational basis. 
In any event, Oregon is seeking a waiver not simply from the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, but from Congress it-
self. 3° Congressional approval of the Oregon plan is not even fet-
tered by the minimal legal restraints the courts have placed on the 
29. Crane v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 532, 539 (N.D. Ga. 1976). The court went on to 
state: 
Thus once a project has been approved by the Secretary, it is the function of the 
courts only to determine whether his decision was arbitrary and capricious and 
lacking in rational basis. [citations omitted.] That review is to be based on the 
record used by the decision-maker. . . . Given the large degree of judgment vested 
in the Secretary with respect to approval of 1115 projects, it is not for the courts to 
deny the Secretary the right to approve a project merely because the Court might in 
certain situations disagree with his judgment. That judgment is committed to the 
Secretary and must be sustained as long as he exercises it within the confines of the 
statute. And, as the case law shows, the only prerequisite to the exercise of that 
authority is that in the Secretary's judgment the demonstration or experiment fur-
thers the objectives of the appropriate title of the Act, in this case Title XIX [Medi-
caid]. /d. 
The court's interpretation of the provisions of section 1115 of the Social Security Act are also 
consistent with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, which permits ad-
versely affected persons to challenge the substance (as opposed to the procedures) of adminis-
trative action only on the basis that it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1990). 
30. While this arguably demonstrates the degree to which the Oregon plan is incompati-
ble with the objectives of Medicaid, a congressional waiver probably is being sought to avoid 
political pressure being placed on the executive branch to deny a section 1115 waiver. See 
Lund, supra note 17, at 45 ("HCFA [the Health Care Financing Administration within the 
Department of Health and Human Services] can approve the waivers without Congress' per-
mission, said Sidney Trieger, who directs the agency's [HCFA's] division of health systems. 
'Given a proposal of this sensitivity, it doesn't hurt to have Congress show its support.' If 
182 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 1:175 
Secretary's discretion to grant waivers. Congress established Medi-
caid and Congress can change it or even abolish it; its action is law-
ful so long as it is constitutional, and as discussed above, there does 
not seem to be any constitutional impediment to the Oregon plan. 
From a legal perspective, therefore, the main question is not 
whether the Oregon plan is lawful in any narrow, technical sense. 
Rather, the question is whether the tools of legal analysis shed any 
light on whether Congress and the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services should approve the plan as being consistent with sound 
public policy. 
To answer this question, two issues must be addressed: First, 
what are the costs and benefits of the Oregon plan? Second, is it 
fair? 
III. COSTS AND BENEFITS 
Philosophically, the Oregon plan is premised on the utilitarian 
principle of the greatest good for the greatest number. 31 This in 
itself is troubling, since strict utilitarianism has never been an ac-
ceptable basis for public decision-making in our society. 32 Instead, 
the Constitution and the laws flowing from it recognize a panoply of 
individual rights which may not be compromised merely to provide 
benefits to the majority. A state could not actively kill a severely ill 
Medicaid recipient against his or her will even though doing so 
would free up substantial resources for more profitable use by 
others. By the same token, it may be impossible to justify depriving 
a Medicaid recipient of a medical resource needed to save his or her 
life merely in order to provide basic medical services to others. 33 
Oregon tries to bypass Congress, Gore says that he will introduce legislation barring HCFA 
from unilaterally approving the waivers"). 
31. See Golenski, A Report on the Oregon Medicaid Priority Setting Project 7 (Mar. 
1990) (unpublished paper) ("Both efficiency and equity should be considered in allocating 
health care resources. Efficiency means that the greatest amount of appropriate and effective 
health benefits for the greatest number of persons are provided with a given amount of 
money. Equity means that all persons have an equal opportunity to receive available health 
services."). 
32. Even the court in Ellis which refused to require states to fund transplants under 
Medicaid on the ground that the program was intended "to provide the largest number of 
necessary medical services to the greatest number of needy people," would only permit utili-
tarian objectives to override the provision of "risky, unproven procedures." 859 F.2d at 55. 
33. Even though the Supreme Court has refused to recognize a right to health care, it 
might nevertheless hold that the fundamental interest in one's own life precluded a state from 
depriving a Medicaid recipient of a life-saving medical resource without a compelling state 
interest, and that expanding the population of Medicaid eligibles without increasing taxes or 
reducing provider reimbursement was an insufficient justification. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U.S. 618, 632-33 (1969) (fiscal considerations ordinarily are not sufficient to sustain a 
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Assuming that the utilitarian approach is a defensible one, how-
ever, the acceptability of the Oregon plan depends on whether the 
benefits of the plan- in particular, expanding eligibility for Medi-
caid - outweigh the costs of denying payment for certain medical 
services for those presently eligible. A specific answer to this ques-
tion depends on what types of care will be withheld from how 
many, and on what services will be extended and to how many. 
This is not easy to determine, since the details of the plan are still 
being worked out. As of this writing, the Health Services Commis-
sion has not yet issued its priority list of medical services; nor has 
the legislature decided at what point on that list it will draw the 
line. For the most part, therefore, the present inquiry must be con-
tent with examining the process by which these decisions are to be 
made. 
In essence, the Oregon plan will establish a cost/benefit ratio for 
each health care service, and will rank services in order of most to 
least net benefit. 34 The guiding principle for ranking services is util-
itarian: services will be ranked higher if they provide greater benefit 
for greater numbers of people. 35 The benefits of the various services 
will be calculated using a formula that considers the duration of the 
benefit, the probability that the benefit will occur, and the relative 
importance of the benefit as indicated by public hearings, commu-
nity meetings, telephone surveys and the collective judgment of the 
Health Services Commission. 36 Costs are regarded as the costs of 
treatment.37 
If this process accurately measured the costs and benefits of var-
suspect classification); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 716-17 n.2 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) ("there is simply no way in which the Court ... could declare that the loss of a person's 
life is not an interest cognizable within the 'life' portion of the Due Process Clause."). 
34. See Oregon Health Services Commission, Preliminary Report, Exhibit 5 (March 1, 
1990) (unpublished report) [hereinafter OHSC Preliminary Report] ("The result is a net ben-
efit value for each condition-treatment pair. Hundreds of condition-treatment pairs will be 
arrayed from the most important to the least important (the most negative numeric value to 
the most positive numeric value, respectively)."). 
35. One utilitarian dilemma is how to compare a service that yields a large amount of 
benefit to a small number of people with a service that yields a small amount of benefit to a 
large number of people. The Health Services Commission apparently will treat the benefit 
from these services as equivalent. See id. at Appendix 5 ("The efficiency of each condi-
tion/treatment pair is determined by the duration of its described outcomes. The Commis-
sion decided on this approach rather than directly taking into account the number who may 
benefit from a treatment. In this way, if the incidence of a condition is rare but the opportu-
nity to correct it is high, a person will not be denied treatment on the basis of having an 
unusual condition."). 
36. See id. at 10-1 I. 
37. See id. at II. 
184 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 1:175 
ious services, the rank ordering that it produced might be an accept-
able starting point for deciding which resources to fund. However, 
the rankings will not represent a true measure of the benefits and 
costs of medical services for actual patients. Instead, it will reflect at 
most the views of generally healthy people toward hypothetical, fu-
ture situations. 38 In this sense, the rankings resemble the purchase 
of accident insurance; they no more reflect the benefits and costs of 
health services than how much I choose to pay for insurance reflects 
the actual costs of the future accidents I may have.39 The hypothet-
ical nature of the opinions upon which the rankings are based is 
reinforced by the fact that, by and large, the opinions are those of 
people who are not Medicaid recipients and who probably do not 
expect ever to be in the situations they were evaluating. 
Another reason for questioning the accuracy of the rankings is 
that a collective judgment about the value of different services does 
not reflect their value to the Medicaid recipient who is being forced 
to forego the services, any more than a physician's views on what 
treatment would be best for the patient necessarily reflects what the 
patient would choose for himself.40 The Oregon approach thus runs 
counter to the well-established principle of informed consent, which 
holds that only the patient's own choices can reflect the value of 
alternative services. 41 The premise that choices can be made collec-
tively for an individual also contradicts market theory, which holds 
38. The questionnaires on which the rankings are based stress the hypothetical nature of 
the responses. The telephone interviewers, for example, instruct respondents to "assume you 
would have no other problems than the ones described," and ask them to rate "health situa-
tions" like the following on a score from 0 to 100: "You can go anywhere and have no 
limitations on physical or other activity, but have a bad bum over large areas of your body." 
Jd. at 1, 3. 
39. The rankings are even less accurate than the purchase of insurance for purposes of 
valuing health services, since ranking does not involve actual payment by those doing the 
ranking. 
40. This problem arises in connection with any decision about what services to cover 
that is not made by the actual patient, such as the determination by Congress that Medicaid 
will not cover services such as abortions. It also is characteristic of other methods for suppos-
edly comparing the costs and benefits of health services, such as the use of "quality-adjusted 
life years" or "QALYs." See, e.g, K. WARNER AND B. LUCE, COST BENEFIT AND COST-
EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS IN HEALTH CARE: PRINCIPLES AND POTENTIAL 148 (1982). For 
this reason, some commentators stress the need to allow individuals to decide which services 
or benefit plans to purchase for themselves. See, e.g., A. EINTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN 138 
(1980). 
41. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C .. Cir. 1972). The only concession 
to patient autonomy in the Oregon plan is the recognition that patients should be allowed to 
choose between "available alternative treatments," and even this is limited by the require-
ment that these choices be made "in consultation with health planners." See Golenski, supra 
note 31, at 7. 
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that efficient outcomes can only result from individual, utility-maxi-
mizing decisions. 
Even though, to the extent they are based on public opinion, the 
rankings reflect neither the actual costs and benefits of services, nor 
the preferences of the actual patients, this would not be so much of 
a problem if the process did not introduce systematic biases into the 
results. For one thing, members of the public whose views were 
solicited were probably aware that their responses would help to 
decide what services the state should provide to welfare recipients at 
taxpayers' expense.42 Their opinions therefore may reflect the rela-
tive costs of services rather than their relative benefits. 
Furthermore, the ranking process may systematically under-
value the benefit of certain services. These include services for rare 
diseases or conditions that most people would not expect to encoun-
ter themselves and therefore might not think are important. But 
particularly, the process may undervalue life-saving treatments. 
The legislature's decisions about costs and benefits are based on hy-
pothetical or "statistical" lives rather than on actual or "identifi-
able" lives. 43 Statistical lives - faceless probabilities - in effect are 
less valuable than identifiable lives - trapped miners, babies in 
burning buildings, seamen on a raft, Coby Howard.44 We are will-
ing to spend more to save an identifiable life because of our natural 
empathy for the victim and our instinct for heroic behavior.45 Yet 
like Coby Howard, the Medicaid eligible who is denied a life-saving 
42. See OHSC Preliminary Report, supra note 34, at Exhibit 3 (the community was told 
that, although Senate Bill 27 "means that many more people will be served, it also means that 
there may not be enough money to provide all the services that people may want. For this 
reason, the law requires that health services be ranked in order of importance."). 
43. See Statement of John Kitzhaber, M.D., on SB 27, before the Health Insurance and 
Bio-Ethics Committee of the Oregon Senate 21-22 (undated) ("If ... we can develop a list of 
priorities based on health outcomes we shift the focus of the debate from the individual to 
society. At that point, the debate ceases to be which individual is granted or denied which 
health care service. Rather, the debate becomes which service should be funded first, second, 
third, and fourth - for the entire population - within the context of limited resources."). 
For a discussion of identifiable versus statistical lives, see Fried; 17ze Value of Life, 82 HARV. 
L. REv. 1415 (1969); Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping With Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Med-
ical Care: 17ze Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 6, 21-25 (1975). 
44. Coby Howard was a seven year-old leukemia patient who died after the Oregon 
legislature stopped funding Medicaid bone marrow transplants in 1987. Apparently, he died 
before he would have been a suitable candidate for the procedure. See Golenski, supra note 
31, at 4. The fact that his death nevertheless generated a furor serves to underscore the high 
cost of rationing life-saving treatments. 
45. Blumstein says that, in paying more to save an identifiable than a statistical life, we 
are succumbing to institutional blackmail. See Blumstein, Constitutional Perspectives on Gov-
ernment Decisions Affecting Human Life and Health, 40 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 
1976, at 231, 252-253. One wonders how he would account for such phenomena as love and 
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resource is an actual person who is identifiable to his family and 
friends, typically to one or more physicians or provider institutions, 
and perhaps to the public through the news media. By making ra-
tioning decisions on the basis of cheaper statistical lives, the Oregon 
legislature may discount the significant, albeit intangible, costs 
when a preventable death occurs, and therefore may make unwar-
ranted trade-offs during the budget process.46 
The risk that lifesaving treatments will be undervalued is borne 
out by the preliminary ranking undertaken by the Bioethics Con-
sulting Group. 47 Organ transplants for hearts, heart/lungs, livers 
and bone marrow were ranked next to lowest (a rank of three on a 
scale from one to ten), below smoking cessation (ranked six), foot 
friendship. In any event, the aspersions he casts do not eliminate the high cost of rationing 
lifesaving treatment for identifiable lives. 
46. For a more complete development of this issue, see Mehlman, Rationing Expensive 
Lifesaving Medical Treatments, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. I. While legislators may be able to blind 
themselves to the value of identifiable lives, judges cannot, if only because the actual victim of 
a decision to deny health care tends to be before the court. Therefore, judicial decisions in 
rationing cases are likely to be more accurate reflections of the costs and benefits of rationing. 
It is instructive, therefore, that courts rarely have denied lifesaving treatment on utilitarian 
grounds. In Montoya v. Johnston, 654 F. Supp. 511 (W.D. Texas 1987), for example, the 
court rejected the state's argument that placing a $50,000 cap on funding for transplants -
which would preclude liver transplants - would make more resources available for others: 
The Texas Department of Human Services opposes exceeding the $50,000 cap 
claiming that there are limited funds in the Medicaid budget and that funding these 
procedures diverts funds from less risky and more beneficial uses as far as total 
recipients are concerned. The Court, however, notes that in a recent fiscal year only 
95 of the approximately one million Medicaid patients in Texas exceeded the sum of 
$50,000. Therefore, since only .000095 percent of all Texas Medicaid claims previ-
ously exceeded the sum of $50,000 annually, it would appear that exceeding the 
limit in plaintiff's case would only have an extremely minimal effect, if any, on the 
funds available for other recipients. As such, the Court is of the opinion that a 
greater benefit is achieved in permitting funding for the transplants than in refusing 
to exceed the $50,000 cap. 
654 F. Supp. at 514. It is interesting that the court evidently felt that $15 million a year (95 
X $50,000) was a "minimal" sum compared with the costs of allowing Medicaid recipients in 
need of transplants in Texas to die. Similarly, in Todd v. Sorrell, 841 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1988), 
the U.S. Court of Appeals, in reversing a lower court's refusal to order a liver transplant 
under Medicaid, balanced the costs and benefits stating: "Undoubtedly the harm to the plain-
tiff would have been enormous, indeed fatal, were the injunction denied, and the harm to the 
Commonwealth if granted, while it may not have been negligible, was measured only in 
money and was inconsequential by comparison." 841 F.2d at 88. Indeed, even in a recent 
case in which a federal appellate court interpreted the 1987 amendments to Medicaid to make 
coverage of certain transplants optional, the court did not allow the 10-month old plaintiff to 
die, since the state had agreed to fund the transplants after the suit had been filed. The court 
even ordered the judge below to make sure that the state provided enough resources to fund 
the transplants. See Ellis v. Patterson, 859 F.2d at 56. 
47. See Golenski, supra note 31, at 7-9. According to Golenski, the results of this pro-
cess led the Oregon legislature to enact Senate Bill 27. !d. at 10 ("The legislature responded 
to these reports by passing groundbreaking legislation."). 
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care for the elderly (also ranked six) and dentures (ranked seven). 
Only one service was ranked lower: cosmetic plastic surgery 
(ranked at one).48 A report on the priority-setting process explains 
that the ranking was based on "the very small number of individu-
als who would benefit, the low probability of individual benefit in 
many cases, the poor quality of life post-procedure and the high 
costs of the procedures and after-care."49 
It is hard to find support in the scientific literature for this view 
of transplant procedures. Organ transplantation is providing 
thousands of people with longer lives of acceptable quality. Survival 
rates for heart transplants show that between 73.9 and 81.9% of 
transplant recipients are still alive after 5 years, and 73.3% are still 
alive after 10 years. 50 Virtually all survivors report a satisfactory 
quality of life. 5 1 Liver transplants have a one-year survival rate of 
83%. 52 Satisfied that the safety and efficacy of liver transplants has 
been established, the Health Care Financing Administration re-
cently proposed to cover them under Medicare, at a projected cost 
of $295 million. 53 Advances are also being made with bone marrow 
transplantation. 54 Furthermore, the cost of these transplants is de-
creasing. 55 (All of this may explain Dr. Kitzhaber's recent predic-
48. See Golenski & Blum, The Oregon Medicaid Priority-Setting Project 12-16 (March 
30, 1989) [hereinafter Priority Setting Report]. 
49. Id. at 15-16. 
50. Heck, Shumway & Kaye, The Registry of the International Society for Heart Trans-
plantation: Sixth Official Report - 1989, ·g J. HEART TRANSPLANTATION 271, 272, 275 
(1989). Heart/lung transplants have a five-year survival rate of 55.4%. /d. at 276. 
51. See Meister, McAleer, Meister, Riley & Copeland, Returning to Work After Heart 
Transplantation, 5 J. HEART TRANSPLANTATION !54 {1986). 
52. Eid, Steffen, Sterioff, Porayko, Gross, Weisner & Krom, Long Term Outcome After 
Liver Transplantation, 21 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 2409 (1989). In another study, 
all recipients reported a better quality of life and 90% reported only minor job problems I 
year after transplantation. Pennington, Quality of Life Following Liver Transplantation, 21 
TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 3514 (1989). Children who have received liver trans-
plants have a one year survival rate of 69-83% and all school-aged survivors were in school 
with only a "no-contact-sports" restriction. Andrews, Wanek, Fyock, Gray and Benser, 
Pediatric Liver Tra11Splantation: A Three-Year Experience, 24 J. PEDIATRIC SURGERY 77, 82 
(1989). 
53. 55 Fed. Reg. 8552 (March 8, 1990). 
54. The International Bone Marrow Transplant Registry reports that bone marrow 
transplants are increasing by 11% per year, and that victims of certain types of cancers have 
a 5-year, disease-free survival rate of between 40 and 60%. Bertin & Rimm, Increasing Utili-
zation of Bone Marrow Transplantation, 48 TRANSPLANTATION 453, 455-56 (1989). 
55. A recent study found that the cost of a heart transplant at one hospital declined 
from $63,935 in 1984 to $33,276 in 1987. Saywell, Woods, Halbrook, Jay, Nyhuis & 
Lohrman, Cost Analysis of Heart Transplantation from the Day of Operation to the Day of 
Discharge; 8 J. HEART TRANSPLANTATION 244, 247 (1989). Use of a new immunosuppres-
sive drug, FK506, reduced liver transplant costs from $244,863 to $134,169. See Staschak, 
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tion that the legislature will decide to fund at least some of these 
transplants. 56) 
The potentially unwarranted denial of lifesaving treatments is 
not the only cost of the Oregon plan. The categorically needy will 
lose their statutory entitlement to whatever other medically neces-
sary services the legislature refuses to fund in order to increase the 
number of eligibles. 57 In addition, all Medicaid recipients will lose 
a number of common law rights. Senate Bill 27 provides that "any 
health care provider or plan contracting to provide services to the 
eligible population under this Act shall not be subject to criminal 
prosecution, civil liability or professional disciplinary action for fail-
ing to provide a service which the Legislative Assembly has not 
funded or has eliminated from its funding pursuant to section 8 of 
this Act [the provision establishing the ranldng and rationing pro-
cess]."58 This eliminates the legal responsibility of physicians and 
other health care providers to ensure that their patients receive rea-
sonable health care services. Absent the exculpatory provision in 
the bill, providers who refused to furnish their patients with medi-
cally necessary services merely because the state refused to pay for 
the services could be liable for the tort of abandonment and for mal-
practice. 59 Providers also have a legal obligation to inform patients 
of the risks and benefits of alternatives and to obtain the patient's 
informed consent to treatment. 60 Senate Bill 27 may protect a pro-
vider who fails to inform a patient that there is a service that the 
patient needs but that the provider is not supplying because it is not 
covered under Medicaid.61 
Wagner, Block, Van Thiel, Jain, Fung, Todo & Starzl, A Cost Comparison of Liver Transplan-
tation with FK 506 or CyA as the Primary Immunosuppressive Agent, 22 TRANSPLANTATION 
PROCEEDINGS 47, 49 (!990). 
56. Am. Med. News, March 16, 1990, at p. 20, col. 4. 
57. See supra discussion at notes 9-15, and accompanying text. 
58. Senate Bill 27, sec. 10 (codified at OR. REv. STAT. § 414.745). 
59. See Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., 285 N.Y. 389, 34 N.E.2d 367 (1941) (hos-
pital liable for injuries to plaintiff after discharging him prematurely due to his inability to 
pay); Becker v. Jaminski, 15 N.Y.S. 675 (1891) (jury instructed that physician owes indigent 
and wealthy patients same degree of care); Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307, 64 P.2d 208 (1937) 
(complaint against physician who refused to continue treatment of patient who could not pay 
old bills). See also Wickline v. State of California, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1064 
(1986), holding that the physician is responsible for insuring adequate patient care despite 
cost constraints imposed by third-party payers. 
60. See Canterbury v. Spence, 444 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
61. The bill contains a provision that requires the provider to inform the Medicaid re-
cipient "of any service that is medically necessary but not covered under the contract [with 
the state] if an ordinarily careful practitioner in the same or similar community would do so 
under the same or similar circumstances." Senate Bill 27, sec. 6(7) (codified at OR. REV. 
STAT. § 414.725(7). Since the Oregon plan is unique, it is impossible to know what another 
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The costs of the Oregon plan, however, must be weighed against 
its benefits. By spending less on current eligibles, funding will be 
available to extend coverage to more people. Senate Bil127 expands 
eligibility to all persons whose incomes are below the federal pov-
erty level. Although this potentially comprises 138,000 people, 62 
only 10,000 are expected to enroll in the program by the end of the 
first budget cycle. 63 Furthermore, unless the legislature drastically 
cuts services the savings may not be significant. Estimates on how 
much money was saved by withdrawing funding from transplants 
during the 1987-1989 budget cycle range between $550,000 and 
$1.1 million a year. 64 The larger estimate is less than one per cent 
of Oregon's Medicaid expenditures as projected for fiscal year 1990-
1991.65 
Expanding the population entitled to receive services under 
Medicaid is not the only benefit from Senate Bill 27. It will also 
increase payments to providers of care, 66 and will prevent their re-
imbursement from being reduced if the program costs more than 
the legislature originally estimates. 67 For example, it has been esti-
mated that the higher reimbursement rates will provide an addi-
tional $1.4 million in payments to providers during the :first year of 
the program.68 The increase in provider reimbursement arguably 
provider would tell a patient in the same situation, and therefore impossible to predict how 
this provision will be interpreted. 
62. See Golenski, supra note 31, at 2-3 ("Given Oregon's Medicaid eligibility restric-
tions, of the 300,000 residents living at or below the Federal Poverty Level, only 162,000 
qualify for Medicaid"). 
63. See Shostak, supra note 17, at 3; OREGON ASSOCIATION OF HOSPITALS, RATIONING 
AND MANDATES, in CAPITOL COMMENTS: 1989 LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES I (undated) 
(" ... officials anticipate approximately 10,200 new enrollees the first year"). 
64. See Welch and Larson, supra note 7, at 171 (Oregon Division of Adult and Family 
Services estimated transplant costs during 1987-1989 of $2.2 million), 172 (giving Craig Ir-
win's estimate that the state would have spent only $1.1 million on transplants during 1987-
1989). 
65. See Shostak, supra note 17, at 3 (projecting $174 million available to spend during 
1990-1991). 
66. See Lund, supra note 18, at 45 ("the program anticipates raising the fees paid to 
physicians and hospitals ... "). See a/so OREGON AsSOCIATION OF HOSPITALS, supra note 
· 63, at 2 ("We anticipate that ... those providers who contract to provide services will be 
adequately reimbursed"; "[t]he concepts embodied in this legislation are dependent upon re-
moving the current financial disincentive to provide care ... "). 
67. See Senate Bill 27, sec. 8(!)(b) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 414.735(I)(b)) ("If 
insufficient resources are available during a contract period ... [t]he reimbursement rate for 
providers and plans established under the contractual agreement shall not be reduced."). 
68. This is based on projections by Shostak that HMO contracts would increase from 
approximately $90 per enrollee per month to $102. See Shostak, supra note 17, at 4. 
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will increase access for Medicaid recipients, and enhance the quality 
of the providers willing to treat them. 
Senate Bill 27 also is intended to help hold the line on tax in-
creases and other methods of increasing the funds available for 
Medicaid. As Dr. Kitzhaber notes: 
The first reality is that our resources are limited. This is particu-
larly true in our state where we have not only a constitutional 
requirement to live within a balanced budget, but an expenditure 
limitation and a revenue limitation as well .... We are acutely 
aware that there is a limit to the level of taxation that the public 
will tolerate. . . . When money is spent on one set of services it is, 
by definition, not available to spend on other services. Health 
care services must compete with all the other legitimate services 
state government must provide. 69 
By withholding payment for services that rank low on the priority 
list, Senate Bill27 enables the state to limit the funds needed to pay 
for its expanded Medicaid program by controlling how much it 
spends. 
A final potential benefit is that the Oregon plan creates a mecha-
nism that makes rationing decisions public. This forces the legisla-
ture and the public to confront the hard choices before them, rather 
than allowing them to be made by default or by individual health 
care providers in a manner that shields them from public view. In 
fact, some people believe that the prospect of rationing will prompt 
the legislature to increase funding for Medicaid rather than to cut 
necessary services. 70 On the other hand, Oregonians are reported to 
be extremely reluctant to increase taxes to pay for greater cover-
age, 71 and their political leaders seem unwilling to try to change 
their minds. 72 Indeed, the legislature's decision to halt funding for 
transplants in 1987 suggests that the state will allow people to die 
69. Statement of John Kitzhaber, M.D., supra note 43, at 13. 
70. See, e.g., Meyer, Rationing Questions Loom with Oregon Plan, Am. Med. News, 
Aug. 25, 1989, at 10, col. 2 (statement by chairman of Oregon Health Services Commission 
that "[p]eople are worried that the legislature may be inclined to spend less after looking at 
the list. But I think they might spend more because they'll see that the list of what's covered 
will be short if they appropriate $1 million and pretty long if they appropriate $500 
million."). 
71. See, e.g., Robinson, Who Should Receive Medical Aid?, PARADE, May 28, 1989. 
(93% of those Oregonians polled said that every American has a right to health care, but "the 
majority voted overwhelmingly against any increase in taxes to pay for it"). 
72. The degree of Dr. Kitzhaber's interest in increasing funding for Medicaid may be 
indicated by his statement that "[f]unding more services may require raising taxes or taking 
money out ofthe schools." Meyer, Oregon Medicaid Plan Gets Boost from Health Care Exec-
utives' Poll, Am. Med. News, March 16, 1990, at 20, col. 4. 
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rather than come up with increased funding for expensive life-sav-
ing services. 
Will the benefits that can be expected from the Oregon plan -
expanded eligibility, increased payments to providers, fiscal conser-
vatism and public rather than private decisions on rationing - out-
weigh the costs in terms of medically necessary services withheld, 
legal rights forfeited, and lives lost in a spectacle of public indiffer-
ence? The answer is not clear-cut. More fundamentally, it is not 
evident how the benefits can actually be compared with the costs. 
How does one value a life, 73 or the requirement that rationing deci-
sions be made publicly? Insofar as the Oregon plan is designed to 
make these trade-offs based on these factors, it may end up making 
rationing decisions in a largely arbitrary fashion. 
IV. FAIRNESS 
Even if the costs of the Oregon plan do not outweigh the bene-
fits, the plan may be objectionable on the grounds of fairness. It is a 
zero sum game; in order to expand the number of eligibles, someone 
else must give something up. As noted at the outset, what is given 
up could be revenues to providers or the income of taxpayers. But 
under Senate Bill 27 it is the scope of covered services. 74 To deter-
mine if the plan is fair, therefore, the first question that must be 
asked is: who wins, and who loses? 
The primary losers under the Oregon plan are those persons 
who were eligible for Medicaid before the enactment of Senate Bill 
27. Generally speaking, these are the poorest people in the state. 
They comprise persons who qualify for Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (principally single parents and their children). 75 
Most of these families have incomes below 58% of the federal pov-
erty level. Some, the so-called "medically needy" have incomes 
above this threshold but would drop below it if they had to pay 
73. For a discussion of the possibilities, see Mehlman, Health Care Cost Containment 
and Medical Technology: A Critique of Waste Theory, 36 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 778, 791-99 
(1986). 
74. See supra discussion at notes 8-16 and accompanying text. 
75. Prior to the passage of Senate Bill 27, Oregon's Medicaid program also covered the 
other major group mandated as categorically needy under federal law, those persons ~ho 
qualify for Supplemental Security Income - primarily the aged, blind and disabled. Senate 
Bill 27 expressly exempts them from its rationing scheme. See Senate Bill 27, sec. 3(2) (codi-
fied at OR. REv. STAT. 414.710(3)); Kosterlitz, Oregon Wants a Little Medicaid Slack, 21 
NAT'L J. 2766 (1989) ("Also viewed suspiciously by [Congressman] Waxman's staff is the 
fact that the state's plan would exempt the elderly and disabled medicaid [sic] recipients, who 
are represented by powerful lobbies"). Section 3(2) of the bill also exempts long-term care 
from the prioritization process. 
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their medical bills. In addition, some persons are eligible to receive 
Medicaid benefits by virtue of receiving state general assistance or 
emergency assistance. 76 As the Oregon plan progresses and more 
eligibles enroll, it can be expected that more services will be 
dropped. Therefore, losers under the plan include each group of 
eligibles whose services are cut to make way for later waves of 
enrollees. 77 
Who wins? The obvious winners are those Oregonians who were 
not eligible for Medicaid prior to the expansion of the program in 
Senate Bill 27. These are persons who would qualify for Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children except that their incomes, while 
still below the federal poverty level, were above the state income 
thresholds, plus childless couples and single adults who do not re-
ceive general or emergency assistance. There is no question that 
these people are far from being well-off, or that they need and de-
serve access to basic medical services. What is striking, however, is 
that they are by and large somewhat better off than those who were 
eligible for Medicaid before the plan was adopted. That is, they are 
persons whose incomes are higher, or who are employed, or who 
are not dependent children. 78 
In essence, then, the Oregon plan shifts resources from the 
worst off to those slightly better off. This alone raises doubts about 
its fairness. The objection is not that the newly eligible will be cov-
ered under the program. The question instead is whether it is fair to 
expand the eligibility requirements by taking medically necessary 
resources away froni those who are even worse off. This would 
seem to violate the principle that a redistribution of resources is 
unjust unless it benefits the least advantaged in society.79 
However, the newly eligible are not the only persons to benefit 
from the Oregon plan. The provider reimbursement provisions of 
Senate Bill 27 mean that providers will not have their reimburse-
ment levels reduced in order to pay for expanded eligibility. 80 In 
76. The federal government does not contribute to the costs of providing care for these 
last two groups. 
77. See supra discussion at note 17 and accompanying text. 
78. There is undoubtedly a layer of persons just above those who were eligible to receive 
Medicaid prior to the passage of Senate Bill 27 who, as a result of not being eligible, were in 
fact poorer than persons who earned less but were eligible. But the expanded group of 
eligibles clearly includes persons who, while still poor, have a higher standard of living than 
those who previously were entitled to Medicaid. 
79. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302 (1971). 
80. See discussion at notes 66-68, supra, and accompanying text. Senate Bill 27 requires 
that providers be reimbursed at "rates necessary to cover the costs of services." Senate Bill 
27, sec. 4a(3) (enacted as OR. REv. STAT. 414.720(3)); Coopers & Lybrand, Oregon Medicaid 
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fact, provider reimbursement will increase. 81 Ironically, estimates 
of the additional amount that will be paid to providers during the 
first budget cycle of the new program correspond closely to the 
amount that would have been spent on transplants if the legislature 
had not banned coverage of them in 1987.82 Again, this is not to 
say that providers do not deserve higher rates of reimbursement. 
Rather, the point is that it is unfair for providers to receive the addi-
tional funds at the expense of persons who are substantially less well 
off. 
The final winners under the Oregon plan are taxpayers and 
other funding sources for the state's Medicaid budget, if we assume 
that the rationing process allows the legislature to hold the line on 
tax increases to pay for expanded eligibility. 83 In fact, the winners 
might be defined more specifically as Oregon businesses, and partic-
ularly small businesses, since a standard alternative for funding ex-
panded eligibility or increased services is to increase business 
taxes. 84 Tax stability for those who earn enough to pay taxes, and 
Prioritized Health Care System: Final Report on Capitation Methods and Methods for Defin-
ing Necessary Costs I, 4 (March 23, 1990) (unpublished report). This contrasts with the 
prior ~pproach to dealing with increased program costs which was to decrease reimburse-
ment to providers. See, e.g., Kitzhaber, supra note 8, at 5 ("Money can also be saved for the 
state by cutting provider reimbursement rates. In Oregon, the average provider reimburse-
ment reflects a 55% discount"); Jd. at II ("It would be clear to anyone who has taken a 
serious look at the Medicaid program at the state level ... that when the federal government 
mandates additional services on the Medicaid program, without providing adequate federal 
revenues, that [sic] the states (which unlike the federal government, must operate within the 
constraints of a balanced budget) are often forced to respond by changing eligibility and/or 
further reducing provider reimbursement."). 
81. See supra discussion at notes 66-68 and accompanying text. In contrast to the cur-
rent level of "discounted" reimbursement, the accounting firm that is designing the cost-
based payment system recommends in the case of physician fees, for example, that a panel of 
providers be convened "to assist in the determination of necessary costs based on the avail-
able data considering overhead costs and an adequate salary." Coopers & Lybrand, supra 
note 80, at 24. 
82. Compare Welch and Larson, supra note 6, (citing Oregon Division of Adult and 
Family Services estimate that transplants would have cost $1.1 million per year during the 
!987-1989 cycle) with Shostak, supra note 16, (providing basis for estimate that providers will 
receive an additional $1.4 million per year during the first two years of the program). 
83. See supra discussion at note 69 and accompanying text. 
84. See Priority Setting Report, supra note 48, at 1-2 ("Most states which are struggling 
with the twin problem of uncompensated care and uninsured citizens are implementing laws 
or regulations which will require employers to bear most of the increased burden of funding 
services, either through taxation or mandatory health benefits"). The Oregon legislature has 
in fact adopted this approach in part; Senate Bill 935 (codified within OR. REv. STAT. 
§§ 316.096, 317.113, 353.725, 353.765, 353.775 (1989)), passed together with Senate Bill 27, 
requires employers to provide insurance coverage to employees or dependents by 1994, or to 
contribute to a state insurance fund. See OREGON HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, STAFF 
MEASURE SUMMARY ON SB 935-B (May 31, 1989). Presumably the amount of employer 
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enhanced competitiveness for Oregon businesses, are no doubt 
worthwhile objectives, but again one must ask if it is fair to achieve 
them by imposing burdens on those who are worse off. 
In sum, almost without exception, Senate Bill 27 allows the bet-
ter off to benefit by stripping medically necessary resources from the 
worst off. In some cases, those who benefit, such as newly eligible 
persons whose incomes are only slightly higher than the state 
thresholds, are better off only marginally, if at all, compared with 
those who lose. In other respects, however, the approach is more 
unfair. For example, by precluding or reducing tax increases for 
the wealthiest taxpayers in the state, the plan takes resources from 
the worst off to benefit the best off. 
It is important to bear in mind- that, in this sense of fairness, 
when the winners are better off than the losers from the start, the 
Oregon plan would be unfair even if it conferred an enormous bene-
fit on the winners and caused only a modest loss for the losers. The 
degree of unfairness, of course, would vary depending on the details 
of the rankings and the resulting rationing scheme. The greater the 
benefit compared to the loss, the less unfair it would be. Similarly, 
the more the costs of the withheld services exceeded their benefits, 
the more difficult it would be to justify imposing those costs even on 
the better off members of society. But the preliminary ranking gives 
little comfort on these scores: the fate of those in need of trans-
plants suggests that what the losers stand to lose is not trivial, and 
that, while the costs of the foregone services may be high, so in 
many cases are their benefits. 
V. AL TERJ'.~ATIVES 
Although it may make it more difficult for the craftsmen of the 
Oregon plan to be sanctimonious about their endeavors, there is lit-
tle practical purpose in raising doubts about the justice of the plan 
unless a better approach can be devised. Since there are only a few 
variables that can be manipulated, the choices are limited. 
One alternative is suggested by Arthur Caplan. "[I]t is hard to 
think of a moral or religious ethic that holds that when a nation 
cannot pay its doctor bills, it is the poor and only the poor who 
should be denied the right to see a doctor," he writes. "It is hard to 
understand how any ethicist could become involved in a scheme so 
blatantly unfair as that of rationing necessary health care only for 
funding would be greater if services for Medicaid eligibles were maintained at pre-Senate Bill 
27 levels. 
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the poor. " 85 One implication of these remarks is that, if care must 
be rationed because it cannot be provided to all, it should be pro-
vided to none. This is not an entirely outlandish idea: during the 
dialysis rationing crisis of the 1960s, at least one hospital closed its 
dialysis facility altogether rather than providing dialysis only to 
those who could pay. 86 Yet, short of preventing a medical resource 
from being developed in the first place, it is hard to imagine how it 
could be denied to everyone, including those wealthy enough to 
purchase it on their own either in this country or abroad. 87 
The discussions in Parts II and III above suggest that Oregon 
should not expand Medicaid eligibility by denying medically neces-
sary services. Assuming that Oregon desires to expand eligibility, 
the obvious alternatives are to increase program funding or to de-
crease provider revenues. Both of these approaches are problem-
atic. Increasing program funding means increasing taxes, and 
Oregonians seem to be unwilling to do this. 88 On the other hand, 
decreasing provider revenues risks driving providers away from the 
program. This jeopardizes access to care for Medicaid eligibles and 
may reduce quality. Moreover, reducing payments disproportion-
ately affects those providers who treat large populations of Medi-
caid patients, and who therefore may be among the least well-off 
providers. 89 Finally, unless services are cut, some increase in pro-
gram funding seems necessary, since it is unlikely that payments to 
providers could be reduced sufficiently to lower the costs of the ex-
panded program to the break-even point. 
Since increasing funding ~eems inevitable, and arguably is pref-
erable to expanding eligibility by reducing provider reimbursement, 
85. See Caplan, How Can We Deny Health Care to Poor While Others Get Face Lifts? 
Los Angeles Times, April 25, 1989, at 7, col. 2. 
86. See Note, Scarce Medical Resources, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 620, 653 (1969). 
87. See Mehlman, Aged-Based Rationing and Technological Development, 33 ST. LOUIS 
U. L. 1. 671, 673 (1989); D. Callahan, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING 
SociETY 199 (1987); Mehlman, supra note 74, at 836-47 (describing methods for discourag-
ing the development and diffusion of socially undesi,rable medical technologies). Callahan 
points out that a public attempt to outlaw medically necessary technology for everyone would 
most likely spawn a black market, with socially disruptive consequences. 
88. See discussion supra at notes 83-84 and accompanying text. 
89. While in the past providers may have been able to increase charges to other patient 
groups to make up for Medicaid payment reductions, increasingly stringent cost containment 
efforts by employers and insurers reduces the availability of this alternative. See Statement of 
John Kitzhaber, M.D., supra note 43 at 2-11. Caplan proposes that providers be required by 
law to furnish a percentage of care for the indigent. See Caplan, supra note 85. This is 
similar to the idea of reducing provider revenues, since it imposes the costs of expanding the 
program solely on providers, assuming that they will be unable to pass these costs on to other 
patients. 
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the question is: What should be the source of the additional funds? 
Part of the design of the Oregon plan is to obtain some additional 
funding from the federal government. This is one of the reasons, it 
will be recalled, for obtaining waivers from the federal govern-
ment. 90 But even if the waivers were granted, the federal govern-
ment would provide only a portion of the additional funds that were 
needed; under federal-state cost sharing, the state would still have 
to come up with its share of the Medicaid budget.91 
Of course, where to find the funds to provide necessary health 
care services to all American citizens regardless of their ability to 
pay is one of the great political issues of our time, and the precise 
answer is beyond the scope of this paper. Some guidelines, how-
ever, might be considered. 
While the courts have not explicitly accorded health care the 
status of a right, they seem to recognize that it is a special type of 
good that should not be subject solely to market forces and ordina-
rily should not be withheld because of the patient's inability to 
pay.92 This is consistent with the following principle of distributive 
justice: necessary health services should not be withheld merely in 
order to maintain inequalities of wealth. In other words, it is more 
appropriate to expand eligibility by requiring the better off to subsi-
dize the less well-off, than by requiring the less well-off to forego 
necessary services. This leads to quite a different approach than 
Senate Bil127. Instead of figuring out how much the legislature has 
to spend on Medicaid, and then determining which medically neces-
sary services this will pay for in order of priority, the state ought to 
determine which services are medically necessary, and then figure 
out how much revenue will be required to pay for them. 
Several objections might be made to this approach. First, 
Oregonians are unwilling to have their taxes raised, and therefore 
this approach is politically unfeasible. This may be true of taxing 
systems that lean too heavily on the less well-off, as demonstrated 
by the demise of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988. 
However, it should be possible to design a taxing scheme that is 
90. See supra discussion at note 17 and accompanying text. 
91. In any event, relying on federal funds to expand coverage merely pushes the ques-
tion one step back: Where would the federal government get the funds? 
92. In addition to the cases cited supra at note 59, there is the famous case of U.S. v. 
Holmes, in which the court stated that drawing lots was the fairest method for deciding who 
should be thrown out of an overcrowded lifeboat so that not all the passengers would drown: 
"(W]e can conceive of no mode so consonant both to humanity and to justice; and the occa-
sion, we think, must be peculiar which will dispense with its exercise." 26 F. Cas. 360, 367 
(E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383). 
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sufficiently graduated to attract the necessary public support, espe-
cially if the benefits were used, in conjunction with other sources, 
to fund comprehensive health insurance for all. 93 Incidentally, this 
would avoid placing a disproportionate burden on providers of care 
-either by drastically reducing their reimbursement or by requir-
ing them to treat the poor free-of-charge. Instead, funds would be 
obtained from providers just like everyone else, with those who 
were in the highest income brackets paying proportionately more 
than their colleagues who were less off. 
A second objection is that, even with increased funding, eco-
nomic resources are finite, while new, cost-increasing medical tech-
nology will continue to be developed indefinitely.94 Initially, it 
should be noted that this is a problem separate from how to provide 
health care for the poor under Medicaid, since the unrestrained 
growth of medical technology eventually will engulf even the re-
sources of the rich. In any event, there are two approaches to deal-
ing with this problem. The first is to attempt to discourage 
technological innovation, or at least to discourage cost-increasing 
innovation. Given the manner in which medical advances take 
place, this is extremely difficult to accomplish directly.95 The alter-
native is to define what is "medically necessary" so that certain ex-
pensive services are not purchased. At first, this may sound like 
Senate Bill 27 all over again, with the term "medically necessary" 
substituted for what remains of the list of ranked services once the 
legislature decides what it will pay for. Given the justice principle 
described earlier, however, the inquiry is quite different: unlike the 
Oregon plan, the list of "medically necessary" services would be 
determined on a clinical basis96 without regard to the wealth of the 
recipient, but with the knowledge that whatever graduated taxing 
93. Caplan proposes a "luxury tax, which could be used to help meet the crucial health-
care needs of the poor .... " Caplan, supra note 85. A steeply graduated income tax may be 
wiser economically than this type of excise tax. 
94. See, e.g., Aaron and Schwartz, Rationing Health Care: The Choice Before Us, 247 
Sci. 418, 421 (I 990) ("The strongest evidence that the United States will have to ration care if 
it wishes to slow growth of health care spending on a sustained basis comes from the creativ-
ity of medical scientists, who continue to develop new services that promise both significant 
benefits for large numbers of people and large added costs for public and private budgets. 
Indeed, the flow of technological innovation shows little sign of abating and may be 
accelerating."). 
95. See Mehlman, supra note 74, at 799-833 (1986). 
96. This would be aided by improving techniques of outcome assessment that helped to 
identify clinically superior and cost-effective technologies. For a description of these tech-
niques, see INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, MEDICARE: A 
STRATEGY FOR QUALITY AsSURANCE (1990). 
198 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 1:175 
mechanism was adopted would be relied on to supply the funds nec-
essary to insure that the services were available to all. 97 Services 
could be rationed under this approach, but on the basis that - like 
cosmetic face-lifts - they were not medically necessary for anyone, 
including the wealthy.98 Conversely, if a service were deemed to be 
medically necessary for the wealthy, the funding mechanism would 
see to it that it was available to all. 99 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In their discussion of the Oregon legislature's 1987 decision to 
halt Medicaid funding for transplants, Welch and Larson state that, 
"[w]hatever one's views on the outcome the Oregon legislature is to 
be commended for confronting such a difficult issue." 100 Whether 
they are correct depends on the future of Senate Bill 27. Its fate is 
in the hands of Congress and the Department of Health and Human 
Services. If Oregon gets the waivers it is seeking, then Senate Bill 
97. In deciding what services a state must provide under Medicaid, the courts have 
interpreted "medically necessary" to mean care that is not experimental and that is "medi-
cally appropriate," and have stated that it is the primary responsibility of the patient's physi-
cian to determine what is necessary. See, e.g., Montoya v. Johnston, 654 F. Supp. 511, 513 
(W.O. Tex. 1987). Other courts have focused on the fact that the treatment is the only 
alternative to treat a serious or life-threatening illness. See, e.g., Allen v. Mansour, 681 F. 
Supp. 1232, 1238 (E.D. Mich. 1986) ("This operation is the only treatment available tore-
solve his liver disease ... "). While some of these factors would be relevant in the decision-
making process I have in mind, the individual physician's judgment would be limited by 
collective clinical decisions. This might resemble the coverage policy-making process used by 
Medicare, or the consensus conference approach used by the Office of Medical Applications 
of Research of the NationBJ Institutes of Health. It is noteworthy that, unlike Oregon, Medi-
care has proposed to fund liver transplants. See supra discussion at note 53 and accompany-
ing text. 
98. If the service were still available despite the decision that it was not medically neces-
sary, better-off persons would be able to purchase it for themselves just as they now can 
purchase amenities such as private hospital rooms, or certain experimental cancer treatments. 
Similarly, those better off would still be able to purchase a different quality of service, such as 
an operation from a renowned surgeon, within certain quality limits established by providers, 
by the government, and by the market-place. See generally, Mehlman, Assun'ng the Quality 
of Medical Care: The Impact of Outcome Measurement and Practice Standards, 18 L. Med. & 
Health Care 368 (1990). 
99. Since this approach entails some form of collective decision-making to determine 
what is and is not medically necessary, it is subject to the objection that it ignores the pa-
tient's personal preferences. Given the choice, for example, a person might prefer a face-lift 
to a liver transplant. I see no way around this objection, except to point out that, within 
broad limits, we seem willing to accept certain constraints on our decision-making autonomy. 
The doctrine of informed consent, for example, does not require a physician to inform the 
patient of all alternatives, but only of reasonable alternatives. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 
464 F.2d at 787. In any event, since this is a problem with the Oregon plan too, it is certai;·1ly 
not a reason for preferring that approach to this one. 
100. Welch and Larson, supra note 7, at 172. 
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27 will become a beacon for other legislatures to follow, 101 and ex-
plicit, wealth-based rationing of health care will proliferate. The 
poor will be the first victims, but not the last: The New York Times 
reports officials in Oregon and Alameda County, California, as say-
ing that they hope the Oregon approach will "provide a model for 
rationing of care for the middle class. . . . " 102 If the waivers are 
denied, and rationing of necessary health services to perpetuate eco-
nomic inequalities is recognized as being morally indefensible, then 
the Oregon legislature will have served us well, for in that case, 
Senate Bill 27 will represent the milepost that finally makes us real-
ize that we have gone down the wrong road. 
101. See Lund, supra note 18, at 46 (similar efforts underway in Colo~ado, Kentucky, 
Alaska, Florida and California). 
102. Gross, What Medical Care the Poor Can Have: Lists Are Drawn Up, New York 
Times, March 26, 1989, at 1, col. I. 
